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GERMAN CITIES
SUCCESS BEYOND
GROWTH?
and set in place the basis of an economic
future, the other cities of eastern Germany do
not yet have the cultural base to follow in
Berlin’s footsteps. With only 1.9% of the pop-
ulation in eastern areas born outside
Germany compared to 10.6% in western
areas, the statistics suggest that the east is still
a long way from producing a genuinely cos-
mopolitan urban culture. It would also sug-
gest that despite the prejudices of right-wing
extremists, a strong migrant community is
clear evidence of a city’s economic health.
Deyan Sudjic is Dean of the Faculty of Art,
Design and Architecture at Kingston University
in London and architecture critic for the
Observer 
LOOKING FOR THE FUTURE
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ermany, after leading the world
for so many years as an
advanced industrial economy, is
now offering the rest of Europe
an accelerated insight into what
life is going to be like with an
ageing population, a falling
birthrate, and a society in which
too few active young people are prepared to
carry the burden of social responsibility
forced on them by demographics.
What was once East Germany has lost
almost 1.5 million of its people since the
reunification of 1990. That drop means that
16% of all homes in the Eastern Länder are
either abandoned or unoccupied. House
prices in these areas have fallen 30% in five
years. In a country with as high a proportion
of owner occupiers as Britain, say, the drop
would have been far steeper, with nothing
short of catastrophic consequences.
Compared to Britain, where home ownership
levels are reaching three out of four house-
holds, just 10% of housing is privately owned
in Berlin, half the levels of Hamburg and
Munich. In some areas the population drop
has been even more vertiginous. The new
cities built by the DDR in the 1950s to serve its
chemical industries have lost as much as one
in three of their population in the last decade.
It is a drop fast enough to threaten disaster.
Some settlements can no longer sustain pres-
sure in their water mains, their sewerage sys-
tems no longer have the critical mass to func-
tion properly, and the survivors are too scat-
tered for public transport to be sustainable.
But Germany is still Germany. It is not a
country prepared to sit back and see all this
just happen. It is doing what it can to shape its
future, rather than fatalistically respond to
events. The positive aspect to this is a massive
investment in transport infrastructure. More
downbeat is a necessary willingness to
embark on a costly programme of housing
demolition, with a view to concentrating the
remaining population in a more sustainable
pattern. Britain’s deputy prime minister 
John Prescott proposed a much more modest
version of the same thing, and has had to face
down bitter political fallout. Heaven only
knows how southern California will deal with
it when gasoline runs out and dooms the 
freeway suburbs to the same kind of extinc-
tion that faced the abandoned city of
Fatehpur Sikri.
This is a far cry from the euphoria of
1990. What was meant to be a huge expansion
in West German prosperity eastward has
turned into an exercise in managed retrench-
ment, albeit a fascinating one. But Germany is
still a society that is ready to contemplate large
plans. It is also a society that in urban terms is
like no other in Europe in that it lacks a single
clearly dominant city. The idea that Germany
has no authentic world city, and its attempts
to deal with the supposed absence of one, have
formed the backdrop to much of the thinking
about urbanism in Germany: in an attempt to
rectify the perceived shortcomings of the lack
of such a city for the most populous state in
Europe, either by creating one, or by finding
an alternative.
There have been a series of more or less
ill-fated attempts to turn Berlin, the most like-
ly candidate for the role of a German Paris or
London, into a genuine metropolis. Speer 
and Hitler set out to build Germania, dou-
bling Berlin’s population, and equipping it
with the stone monuments that would rein-
force its claims to attention by sheer force of
malignant will. Whether such an entity could
ever have been understood as a genuine city,
which is above all else a settlement dedicated
to making the random interactions of life
possible, is open to doubt. Reunification for a
moment brought about another glimpse of a
new version of Berlin as a world city. It was
another chance for a fresh start. And as if to
demonstrate that property development has
always been fuelled by the culture of irrational
exuberance, as much as by cold calculation,
the boldness of reunification resulted in the
construction of a city that failed to reflect the
realities of Germany’s actual urban structure
– a network of cities, rather than a one domi-
nant city of the French or British model. But
while the world’s attention was focussed on
the extraordinary transformation of Berlin’s
old centre, from a fortified wasteland on the
periphery of two cities that never spoke to
each other, into a single entity, the real trans-
formation in Germany was the rise and rise of
Munich, and the eclipse of Frankfurt’s dreams
of becoming a world financial centre the
equal of London. It is a shift that can be meas-
ured in the passenger numbers passing
through the expanding Munich airport, and
the emerging network of ICE trains that has
made Frankfurt the root of a Y-shaped pat-
tern. In fact, despite the impression that
Berlin is the focus of Germany’s most serious
property bust, with 1.75 million sq m of
empty office space, ( 9.7% of the total), it is
close to the European average, while
Frankfurt with a vacancy percentage of 17.2 is
much more challenged.
Just as persistent a theme in thinking
about German cities as the quest for the
metropolis has been the hope that Germany
does not need one and the belief that it should
learn to make the most of what it has. The evi-
dence would suggest that it has indeed done
so. As the world’s leading exporter, economic
growth is concentrated in Germany’s urban
areas. The country’s ten biggest cities account
for 20% of the economy’ s GDP, while accom-
modating only 13% of Germany’s population.
Moreover, the number of new jobs created in
these cities is higher, with a growth rate of
3.1% per year, compared with a national aver-
age growth rate of new jobs of 1.1%. Half of
all the new jobs generated in Germany last
year were in its ten biggest cities.
Germany has invested heavily in its 
transport infrastructure, which investment –
combined with a new tax on fuel and energy –
stopped the long-standing growth in car
mileage. Railways have seen an average annual
growth rates of 3-4%, helped by 215 new high
speed trains linking the major cities. On the
other hand there is no question but that the
old East is economically troubled, and despite
the massive investment in infrastructure,
things are still very different in the two halves
of the country. With 18.8% of the work force
in the east out of a job in 2005, things are
almost twice as bad as they are in the west.
Berlin, if it is not going to be London or
Paris, does seem to have identified a role for
itself as a creative centre, on a grander scale,
continuing the role of the pre-reunification
Kreuzberg as a Bohemian enclave.‘Poor but
sexy’, in the words of its mayor. Dresden also
seems to have found a new role, by recon-
structing its Baroque past. For Halle Joseph
Haydn may not be enough of a future.
Despite the attractions of cheap accom-
modation that has allowed creative commu-
nities to flourish in Berlin and other
depressed but grandly proportioned cities,
G
a worldwide series of conferences investigating 
the future of cities
organised by the Cities Programme at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
and the Alfred Herrhausen Society, 
the International Forum of Deutsche Bank
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GERMANY: A GLOBAL
CITIES SYSTEM?
he globalisation and digitalisa-
tion of the economy will not – as
many experts have prophesied –
lead to a disintegration of cities.
Rather, it will lead to the creation
of a new form of urban centrali-
ty whose chief manifestation is
the ‘global city’. This new type of
city, as Saskia Sassen has demonstrated con-
vincingly, plays a strategic role in the glob-
alised economy: it is in existing global cities
that the control, integration, and manage-
ment functions of global value chains concen-
trate. At the same time, global cities are cen-
tral production locations and transnational
marketplaces for the high quality, knowledge-
based services that feed into the head-office
functions of multinational companies.
Germany has been a world export cham-
pion for many years, and few economies are as
strongly integrated into the world market.Yet
despite this, no German city makes it into the
top group of global cities. Exceptionally, the
Inventory of World Cities classifies Frankfurt
– a ‘small’ city with just 660,000 inhabitants –
as an ‘alpha world city’. But other German
metropolises such as Berlin, Hamburg,
Munich, and Düsseldorf only rank as ‘gamma
world cities’ – third-class global cities. Other
German cities do not even rate a mention.
How, then, can we explain this apparent
contradiction between the central position of
Germany in the global economy, and the fact
that its cities are rated as second or third class?
The usual answer is to point to Germany’s his-
tory, with all its interruptions and peculiari-
ties. Germany gained a single capital city in
only 1871, with the founding of the Prusso-
German Empire. Berlin became the seat of
government and, over time, the dominant
German economic and cultural metropolis –
although it never reached the centrality of
London or Paris. The catastrophes of the Nazi
regime and the Second World War brought
about the collapse of the German Empire and
Germany’s subsequent division into four
occupied zones. The central metropolitan
role of Berlin was dismantled. Many compa-
nies moved away from the geopolitically
unstable Berlin and the Soviet occupation
zone to West Germany. The Reichsbank in
Berlin was closed and, following a decision of
the American occupation government, the
new Bank Deutscher Länder was established
in Frankfurt. In consequence, large banks
such as the Deutsche Bank and Dresdner
Bank relocated their head offices to Frankfurt
and other banks followed suit. Frankfurt
Airport became America’s main German air
force base. Today, gateway functions of
Frankfurt Airport and the city’s role as an
international financial centre are the direct
results of these decisions taken during the
occupation years. Similar historical decisions
led to the specialisation of other cities:
Munich became Germany’s high-tech
metropolis; Hamburg, its news and media
centre; and, with the creation of the German
Federal Republic in 1949, the seat of govern-
ment was moved to Bonn.The result of these
historical developments is evident: today,
Germany has a highly polycentric urban sys-
tem, with its metropolitan functions distrib-
uted between Berlin, Hamburg, Munich,
Frankfurt (Rhine/Main), Cologne/ Düssel-
dorf (Rhine/Ruhr), Stuttgart, and the poten-
tial metropolis Halle/Leipzig/Dresden
(Saxony Triangle). After reunification Berlin
was reinstated as the seat of government, but
it is highly unlikely that it will resume its for-
mer central economic role.
This historical sketch implicitly classifies
Germany’s urban network as a special case in
the hierarchy of the global urban system – a
case that shows clear deficits. Can Germany,
with its globally oriented economy, do with-
out a truly global city? If it cannot, which city
might fill this role?
The discussion on ‘varieties of capitalism’
(Hall/Soskice) supplies a possible alternative
answer to the question of globalisation and
urbanisation in Germany. If it is true that
modern capitalism is not a homogeneous
entity, but that different models of capitalism
have formed themselves under different his-
torical conditions, then it is not unlikely that
these different models also have correspond-
ingly different patterns of urbanisation.
Historical studies show that Germany, as
a late comer industrial nation, developed an
alternative to the liberal system of production
even as early as the end of the 19th century.
Germany’s ‘coordinated market economy’,
coupled with the strongly federal structure of
the German state, formed the basis for the
economic and social system in West Germany.
Because of their specific manufacturing tradi-
tion, German companies concentrated on
producing high-quality, distinctive, customer
-oriented products as an alternative to mass
production and global price competition.
With diversified, export-oriented, high-quali-
ty manufacturing, Germany established itself
in the upper niches of the world market. This
characteristic production model and the
related production strategy led to the phe-
nomenon of ‘manufacturing/service districts’.
In Anglo-Saxon countries, the globalisation
push in the 1980s and 1990s led to a strong
geographical dispersion of industrial func-
tions – an important factor in the growth of
central business functions in global cities. By
contrast, German conurbations showed a
development dynamic that was based strong-
ly on the interaction between knowledge-
intensive industrial activities and company-
focussed services. Since the mid-1990s, this
interactive development has seen some
uncoupling of industrial sectors and regions.
Yet, the relationship between the develop-
ment of industry and of services has not bro-
ken down – it has simply become more dis-
persed. At the same time, individual metropo-
lises are developing increasing specialisations
in particular clusters of high value services.
Underlying this argument is the thesis
that ‘Rhineland capitalism’ has not just pro-
duced an alternative model of production, it
has led to the formation of an alternative,
fully viable model of urbanisation. This
prompts many questions: can Rhineland cap-
italism hold its own against Anglo-Saxon lib-
eral capitalism in the long term? Do German
companies not increasingly depend on ‘buy-
ing in’ management and development knowl-
edge for their global strategies in cities such 
as London and New York? Are we seeing the
emergence of mixed business strategies that
can exploit the advantages offered by both the
decentralised urban system and the central-
ised global cities systyem at the same time?
T
Dieter Läpple is Professor of Regional & Urban
Economics at HafenCity University Hamburg
URBAN NETWORKS 
ON THE MOVE
ermany has a polycentric urban
system with four cities of over a
million inhabitants each
(Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne and
Munich) on top of numerous
mid-sized cities. This character-
istic can be generally said to be
an indication of a balanced spa-
tial development, for instance, when compar-
ing Germany to countries like France or the
United Kingdom, where the dynamics of
growth are strongly concentrated on the capi-
tal region. Essentially, however, the question
as to whether a centralised or rather a decen-
tralised network is advantageous appears
futile given the historical path dependencies
of urban systems and their interconnected-
ness. Noticeable changes inherently require
historical fractures, such as the division of
Germany after the war. During that period,
new networking patterns developed, which
have in turn been reordered again after the fall
of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the major turning
point in recent Germany history.
Decentralisation – just as centralised
structures have their specific costs – cannot be
sustained without paying the price for mobili-
ty and transportation. This applies above all
to supra-regional transportation. In the
course of structural change, major corridors
have significantly gained importance while at
the same time experiencing growth pressures.
The road and rail transportation routes
between the conurbations are – similar to the
nodal points of air and sea transportation –
confronted with limits to growth and capaci-
ty. In contrast, the volume of traffic is static
and  even decreasing in other, more peripher-
al regions of Germany.
The metropolitan regions are anchor
points for Germany’s relatively balanced spa-
tial structure. They bundle the central func-
tions for densely populated areas; are usually
connected to prime nodes of the transporta-
tion and communication networks; and are
considered to be generators of commercial
development on the basis of their population
potential, their economic strength (even in
the knowledge economy), and ultimately be-
cause of their role as gateways for global flows
of people, goods and information. Transport
growth along the major transport corridors
reflects the importance of these hubs.
Examination of the urban network struc-
ture and international accessability has
received theoretical stimulus in recent times
through the ‘New Economic Geography’.
Accordingly, large agglomerations particular-
ly represent the centres of gravity for econom-
ic development, based on productivity advan-
tages, economies of scale and low transport
costs. Consequently, they are at the centre of
development-oriented political concepts. Re-
gional planning policies have also embraced
this viewpoint and promulgate a strategy of
‘stengthening the strong’: encouragement and
support of a few growth cores instead of well
balanced development everywhere.
Admittedly both ‘draft theories’, the New
Economic Geography as well as growth-ori-
ented spatial development policies, still lack
convincing empirical evidence. Firstly, not all
densely populated areas by far are 
economic engines for growth. On the con-
trary, old industrial regions like the Ruhr
Basin, despite high density and excellent 
connections, are icons of decline rather than
places of optimism. Secondly, many prosper-
ous regions in Upper Swabia or Lower Saxony
belong to the so-called ‘silent stars’ remote
from metropolises, basing their success on
factors other than centrality and motorways,
airports or container terminals. Transport-
ation and accessibility are however vitally
important for both areas: the major centres as
well as the prosperous periphery.
Noteworthy differences can be seen in
lifestyle choices, which reveal parallel spe-
heres of life. Supporters of the modern, inter-
national structure of metropolitan regions are
the business élite. They travel predominantly
by airplane between major nodal points and
practice mobility as a form of global nomad-
ism. It is no coincidence that this élite also
makes a significant contribution to the trans-
portation demand. According to recent stud-
ies on long distance travel, 10% of the trans-
portation users in Germany account for
approximately 50% of the total transporta-
tion demand.
For the majority of the population 
actual travelling remains confined to the
localised realm of everyday life actitivies.
The frequency of journeys and travel times
show only a slight increase, even though travel
distances are getting longer due to the spatial
division of labour and individual preferences.
Other than vacation or business trips, most
people are still mainly concerned with how to
organise their intra-urban mobility rather
than how to access international networks.
The mobile lifestyle of the business élite
and the mobility patterns of the majority of
the population can however no longer be dis-
tinguished from one another, and they espe-
cially cannot be played against one another
politically. Long-distance commuters consti-
tute the new middle class mobile nomads,
who regularly fill the ICE trains on Mondays
and Thursdays, with their double lives of sep-
arate places for living and working. A second
example is the growth in air traffic, which
today owes less to the business class than to
the short trips made by John and Jane Q
Public, who gratefully take up the offerings of
low-cost carriers for shopping in London etc.
Low energy prices still allow this type of mass
individualisation and democratisation of
mobility.
However, the conflict over the expansion
of infrastructures – as the example of airports
in Frankfurt demonstrates – makes political
regulation of these matters complex. For one
thing, the roles of perpetrators and victims
are distributed diffusely amongst the airline
passengers and those plagued by aircraft
noise. Additionally, the network economy of
transportion and goods handling attracts
many regions, which hope for compensation
for ongoing deindustrialsation. The phrase
‘job machine’, however, has an empty ring,
since the newly created jobs offer only a frac-
tion of what was lost, in terms of quantity and
quality. If it is true that energy in the future
will never again be so inexpensive and ubiqui-
tously available as in the twentieth century,
then we face what is a suspenseful question
about the transformation of mobility – and its
consequences for the urban system.
Markus Hesse is private lecturer at the Free
University of Berlin
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TOWARDS A EUROPEAN
URBAN FORM
present were still missing. Living quarters
became towns for singles or high income
bracket groups of urban professionals in mar-
keting, media, finance and IT. In contrast,
infrastructures, services, cultural possibilities,
areas for children and spaces for relaxation
were unavailable to families. For them, living
in the city meant a dissociation with the natu-
ral environment. The connection between
redevelopment and contemporary urban
planning and architecture was missing.
In parallel to the massive hollowing out
of some cities and ongoing suburbanisation,
there is now a clear urban renaissance and
growing support for reurbanisation. Cities,
however, are still at risk of losing their role as
cultural and economic catalysts and as social
integrators that alleviate inequality. There is
no doubt that land values and intra-urban
competition for centrality and accessibility
still play a fundamental part in these process-
es. High subsidies that promote new develop-
ments, rather than densification of existing
areas, do their best to significantly advance
suburbanisation, endangering, if not destroy-
ing the characteristics of the European city.
According to a survey carried out by
Empirica in Hamburg some years ago, the
majority of households who were interested
in residential property preferred an inner city
location to property in the countryside, which
they viewed as the second best solution. Their
views on country living did not deviate much
from those of the urban planner: dreary loca-
tions,‘out in the sticks’, boring urban develop-
ments, and ‘terraced boxes on towelling plots’.
The European city certainly has much more
to offer.
Omar Akbar is director of the Bauhaus Dessau
Foundation
Elisabeth Kremer is research associate at the
Bauhaus Dessau Foundation
s it still necessary and topical to consid-
er the European city? It has been
mocked and criticised by modernity
for its limitations, lack of hygiene and
functionality, and its hierarchy of
space. In the 1960s the European city
experienced its dissolution. Together
with the arrival of automobiles en
masse, the occupation of inner city areas by
service centres and office blocks destroyed its
civic spaces. Residential uses were moved to
housing schemes on the outskirts or relocated
to subsidised homes in suburbia. The reaction
to modernity did not fail to appear. Reurban-
isation was promoted in order to stop the de-
molition of cities. In the 1960s and 70s post-
modernism rediscovered the European city.
What had  been seen as disadvantageous
in the past was being rediscovered as a para-
digm of urbanism: it was rediscovered that
small lots and living areas, functioning neu-
trally, could open up the city to change. The
division of land into lots enables diversity in
unity, combining various typologies and
lifestyles. It allows for demolition or new
development without automatically compro-
mising the entire spatial structure.
The same spatial constriction which was
criticised by the modernists, was perceived 
as a density of communications and functions
by the postmodernists; it acted as a stimulant
to the changing economies of the service 
and information sectors and a knowledge-
based society.
In the action group culture of the 1980s,
citizen commitment and public debate called
for the sensitisation of the European city and
its culture. It became more and more clear
that the European city made it possible to
integrate people from different social back-
grounds and nationalities as equal partners
and was able to socially integrate inequalities.
However, the return of the post-modern
to the European city was not its only victory.
Suburbanisation continued. It now developed
peripheral spaces, with new images emerging
that Tom Sieverts so succinctly described as
‘cities between cities’. Socially homogeneous
lower middle class areas began to emerge in
the suburbs, while in the city a social polarisa-
tion set in with a simultaneous upsurge and
decline in parts of the city.
What appears problematic to us is that
the postmodern criticism of the linear pro-
gressive thought of the modernists went to
the other extreme. The postmodernists felt it
their duty to protect the traditional. All too
often in the redevelopment of inner cities, the
reconstruction of historical forms and design
was at the forefront. Not only was it over-
looked that the reconstruction of a historical
building could not actually restore it, but his-
torical forms were also taken out of their orig-
inal context and placed into new contexts.
In the age of globalisation the inner cities
became places for tourists and centres of
consumerism. In this alleged return to the 
traditional, reflection on the demands of the
I
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that is no longer needed is being converted
into semi-communal agricultural or horticul-
tural land at the edges of the city, where it
seamlessly adjoins existing farmland.
However, the land made available has been
annexed by a variety of groups. One family set
out rows of tomato plants; a Japanese martial
arts enthusiast laid out a Zen garden; and
people who enjoyed gardening or simply
being in the fresh air occupied their own
zones. The first act of the new occupiers was
to create a boundary between their areas and
the remaining public space, marking their ter-
ritory and making private space visible. The
reaction of the people of Halle was mixed,
with some protesting against the privatisation
of parts of the newly created public spaces.
CREATING SEMI-PUBLIC SPACES
In inner cities, the demolition of the second
row of buildings in a block is seen as a libera-
tion from excessive density, especially in the
closed courtyards of 19th century districts.
Often, the old auxiliary buildings or servants’
quarters now lie vacant. They are being
replaced with open spaces and green areas,
considerably increasing the residential quality
of life in cities. Buildings constructed along
major traffic arterials or at problematic cor-
ner locations do not retain residential func-
tions. Given the large number of properties
available, tenants have the freedom to avoid
occupying those which they regard as inferior.
The vacant buildings are re-used to house
infrastructure that is lacking, such as parking
spaces or garages. They are also converted
into commercial units, as although traffic cre-
ates noise it also offers passing trade. The gaps
created by demolition are also used for recre-
ation, by the neighborhood or by those living
next door. Another trend is ‘Turning three
into two’, purchasing an adjacent plot and
dividing it up between the two neighbours,
allowing improved access and increasing the
amount of light available to residential units.
Thus although a large number of residential
buildings are due for demolition, the way in
which these spaces are being reused is not sat-
isfactory. The constructions seem temporary
and spontaneous rather than demonstrably
permanent. One has the impression of pio-
neer plants which are subjecting themselves to
an unreliable experiment, and are observed by
all with suspicion.
PUBLIC SPACE: AN OUTDATED CONCEPT?
Increasingly, the way inner city open spaces
(or ‘gaps’) are used is being affected by artistic
interventions or citizens’ interests (‘The Night
of Vacant Lots’: walks through empty lots or
derelict sites). These gaps are occupied by
temporary uses such as (temporary) car sales
areas and election campaigning, so as to
realise any possible economic benefit from
the spaces. In a city whose population is
decreasing, the sense of responsibility for
open spaces and people’s identification with
them are also decreasing. Ideas such as a ‘pub-
lic room’ in urban spaces are increasingly
attractive as providing quasi-public spaces,
areas where the public can take a break, or
informal locations where teenagers and chil-
dren can play and be adventurous.
The borders between public and semi-
public are disappearing in some areas under-
going transformation. Space, formerly at a
premium, is now regarded as a burden. In
part, only increased space for private use is
regarded as positive. Public space as a public
asset is on the decline, and is being concen-
trated in a few central locations. When will we
start to miss it?
Josef Weber is chief urban planner for the City of
Halle on Saale
he title of Wolfgang Kil’s book
‘The Luxury of Emptiness’
accurately describes the situa-
tion of public spaces in shrink-
ing cities. Given the huge
amount of mediocre architec-
ture in our cities, it would not be
difficult to philosophise about
its removal and the resulting freedom for the
creation of public spaces. But this is not the
real issue. Empty, boarded up buildings; win-
dows covered with posters as alternatives to
billboards in urban spaces; derelict buildings
beside restored 19th century facades; gardens
and plots that have run wild and resemble
primeval forests more closely than well-
groomed residential areas – these are sights in
our public realm that arouse negative, or just
unusual, associations. There is simply too
much building stock, too much infrastruc-
ture, too much that is no longer needed and
can no longer be afforded. People’s needs and
requirements have changed, and there are
fewer people around. Since German reunifi-
cation in 1990, people have moved from the
cities out into the suburbs, have left for more
prosperous regions where there are jobs to be
had, and have had fewer children. Combined
with industrial restructuring and changes in
service industries, this has meant that increas-
ing numbers of properties – of various types –
are being left vacant.
In some places, the freedom this offers to
change the use of the buildings or to remove
them altogether is too much for both the pop-
ulation and for planners to handle. What
should we do with so much space? Inevitably,
the inverse question also crops up, a question
that the city of Halle has been asking itself as
part of the IBA Stadtumbau in Sachsen-
Anhalt: how much public space do people
need? And how much can we afford? We can
identify three major trends in this regard:
GREEN SPACES AS A ‘PUBLIC PATIENT’
Given current constraints on municipal
budgets in Germany, attempts are being made
to reduce the monies spent on the mainte-
nance of public space. The level of care given
and the total acreage looked after are both
being reduced in order to minimise financial
burdens. Municipalities are planning low-
maintenance public spaces, for example by
creating forested areas when redeveloping
former high density housing areas. Forests are
the most economical way of using space to
create green areas; they are cheap to create
and also economical to maintain. An example
of this can be found in the Halle district of
Silberhöhe, where a large scale residential
development which already contains a large
number of green areas is being transformed
into an urban forest. Urban public space is
thus regaining ground in our cities.
CITIZENS ANNEXING PUBLIC AREAS
The use of open spaces is also changing. Land
freed up by former supermarkets or housing
THE LUXURY 
OF EMPTINESS
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hy is Berlin so hip? Why
does its late 19th century
Prussian severity attract
people from all over the
world? Can such a poor and
economically disadvantaged
place really become a cos-
mopolitan city? Is it not an
explosive boom which is the elixir for each
and every metropolis?
Berlin is structurally weak, as is the case
for all East German cities.Years of zero
growth and little hope of a more dynamic
near future are as typical here as in Leipzig,
Dresden, Erfurt, Halle, Magdeburg or
Rostock. All of these cities have a large num-
ber of empty flats, shops and offices, and
much industrial land in disuse, that cannot be
easily reoccupied. Instead of the traditional
housing shortage, for the first time in history
there is an abundance of space.
It was almost a shock-wave of deindustri-
alisation that came over the cities of the for-
mer German Democratic Republic in the
aftermath of unification. The old island of
West Berlin already had only a slim, artificially
maintained economy. The industrial enter-
prises of East Berlin were shut down with the
introduction of the deutschmark. Globalis-
ation led to further job losses. Step by step,
companies transferred production from
high-wage Germany to Eastern Europe or 
the Far East.
For a few years the euphoria of unifica-
tion brought a great deal of highly subsidised
real estate investment, but not much lasting
economic power. The government’s reloca-
tion to the new capital of Berlin was and still is
the strongest push for the city’s economic
invigoration, but at the price of the disloca-
tion of as many jobs as the move brought with
it. The hoped for increase in population has
failed to materialise.
Berlin, housing Siemens, Borsig and
AEG, once enjoyed a reputation throughout
the world as a manufacturing city: now it has
less than 100,000 industrial employees. Apart
from the state-owned railway, no company 
of any consequence keeps its headquarters 
in Berlin. The gross domestic product of
Germany’s capital and largest city represents 
a low share of the country’s as a whole.
Unemployment is at 19% and refuses to
abate. Incomes are lower than the national
average. The city is up to its ears in debt.
In comparision to London or Paris it is piti-
fully poor.
Yet the city sparkles with life! Berlin is 
an expert in the art of living and surviving.
It attracts creative and unconventional people
from East and West Germany, and increasing-
ly from all over the world. The growth factor
in this city is creativity, if on a low-budget
level. There are several reasons for this.
There is enough inner city space for cre-
ative living and working, on little money.
THE VITALITY OF A
GROWTH-LESS CITY
W
Young people hungry for adventures and
experimenting have taken over old, disused
factories in the centre of Berlin. Legally or ille-
gally they have settled into the city’s many
empty shops and buildings and brought them
back to a life of morbid charm or modern ele-
gance. With great cunning and tenacity they
have made centres of art and creativity out of
deserted factories and other buildings: the
KunstWerke, Sophiensäle, Kulturbrauerei,
Pfefferberg, Tacheles and others. These initia-
tives are not limited to Berlin. In Leipzig a
gigantic cotton mill has become a cultural and
artistic factory, and even in the small town of
Dessau a group of young people is renovating
and fitting out an enormous old brewery with
great élan.
The quality of life in Berlin is high, yet
affordable. Decades of social democratic city
politics, with a highly subsidised programme
of urban renewal and a good infrastructure,
have contributed to this. The legacy of social-
ism can be seen in inner city nursery schools,
playgrounds and sports fields. Much urban
investment was in fact made with a growing
population in mind. As this has not come
about there is now competition for children
among kindergartens and schools, particular-
ly in middle class districts.
Traffic is decreasing because of poverty,
unemployment and rising petrol prices.
Today Berlin has only 320 cars per 1,000
inhabitants. Even though this is still too many
for the Green Party, it is once again a pleasure
to stroll about the city streets. Life here is not
only affordable; compared with many other
large cities it is remarkably good.You can
bring up your children here, even in trendy
districts like Prenzlauer Berg. Having children
is ‘in’ once again.
But it is not only the urban space and
affordable quality of life that make Berlin so
attractive; there is also a very important
intangible dimension. It is above all the ‘clash
of civilisations’ between the past  ‘actually
existing socialism’ of the GDR and the present
real capitalism which is so compelling. Berlin,
Leipzig or Halle are challenging: take up 
what is left of this history and turn it into a
new future! Take these cities as a school for
structuring globalisation. We are in close 
contact with worldwide social and political
change here.
Of course the majority of people do not
want this; they want to be left in peace. In
Berlin there is an old West Berlin and a mod-
ernised, but mentally just as old, East Berlin.
Both have adapted to the changes – passively
and in sufferance – only as far as absolutely
necessary. This is also the case in other struc-
turally weak cities, which are characterised by
much passivity and resignation.
But the future-oriented, creative people
who have made new lives here outside the
conventional rules, and found the necessary
urban space and like-minded friends, are also
opening new doors for the city and its cultural
and economic identity. Media, IT and adver-
tising, art and music, fashion and design have
become an important core of Berlin’s new
economic life, and will hopefully continue to
grow. For there is no way back to the old
industrial society. Berlin needs to reinvent
itself as a society of knowledge and creativity.
Franziska Eichstädt-Bohlig is a former MP of
the Green Party.
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